A Viewpoint Distinction in the Representation of Propositional Attitudes

Abstract

A representation scheme can be used by a cognitive agent as a basis for its normal, inbuilt cognitive processes. Also, a representation scheme can serve as a means for describing cognitive agents, in particular their mental states. A scheme can serve this second function either when it is itself naturally used by a cognitive agent (that reasons about agents), or when it is merely an artificial, theoretical tool used by a researcher. In designing a representation scheme one must pay very careful attention two related questions: the question of whether, for any given agent, the scheme is used by the agent or is used describe the agent (or both); and the question of whether the scheme is being used as a theoretical tool (as well as, perhaps, being used by agents). I show by example that representational pitfalls can be encountered when these questions are not clearly addressed. The examples revolve around Creary's logic-based scheme and Maida and Shapiro's semantic network scheme, both of which were designed primarily facilitate the representation of propositional attitudes (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.). However, the general points have wider application schemes for propositional attitude representation. By appeal mainly the Maida and Shapiro case I demonstrate also that it is possible be misled by the ambiguity of whether to represent means to denote or to be an ambassador/representative/abstraction of.