Some Variations on Default Logic
Abstract
In the following paper, we view applying default reasoning as a construction of an argument supporting agent's beliefs. This yields a slight reformulation of the notion of an extension for default theories. The proposed formalism enjoys a property which we call rational maximization of beliefs.
Cite
Text
Rychlik. "Some Variations on Default Logic." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1991.Markdown
[Rychlik. "Some Variations on Default Logic." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1991.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/1991/rychlik1991aaai-some/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{rychlik1991aaai-some,
title = {{Some Variations on Default Logic}},
author = {Rychlik, Piotr},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {1991},
pages = {373-378},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/1991/rychlik1991aaai-some/}
}