Some Variations on Default Logic

Abstract

In the following paper, we view applying default reasoning as a construction of an argument supporting agent's beliefs. This yields a slight reformulation of the notion of an extension for default theories. The proposed formalism enjoys a property which we call rational maximization of beliefs.

Cite

Text

Rychlik. "Some Variations on Default Logic." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1991.

Markdown

[Rychlik. "Some Variations on Default Logic." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1991.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/1991/rychlik1991aaai-some/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{rychlik1991aaai-some,
  title     = {{Some Variations on Default Logic}},
  author    = {Rychlik, Piotr},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {1991},
  pages     = {373-378},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/1991/rychlik1991aaai-some/}
}