Preferential Semantics for Goals

Abstract

Goals, as typically conceived in AI planning, provide an insufficient basis for choice of action, and hence are deficient as the sole expression of an agent's objectives. Decision-theoretic utilities offer a more adequate basis, yet lack many of the computational advantages of goals. We provide a preferential semantics for goals that grounds them in decision theory and preserves the validity of some, but not all, common goal operations performed in planning. This semantic account provides a criterion for verifying the design of goal-based planning strategies, thus providing a new framework for knowledge-level analysis of planning systems. Planning to achieve goals In the predominant AI planning paradigm, planners construct plans designed to produce states satisfying particular conditions called goals. Each goal represents a partition of possible states of the world into those satisfying and those not satisfying the goal. Though planners use goals to guide their reasoning, the crude b...

Cite

Text

Wellman and Doyle. "Preferential Semantics for Goals." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1991.

Markdown

[Wellman and Doyle. "Preferential Semantics for Goals." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1991.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/1991/wellman1991aaai-preferential/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{wellman1991aaai-preferential,
  title     = {{Preferential Semantics for Goals}},
  author    = {Wellman, Michael P. and Doyle, Jon},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {1991},
  pages     = {698-703},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/1991/wellman1991aaai-preferential/}
}