A Computational Model of Logic-Based Negotiation
Abstract
This paper presents a computational model of negotiation based on Nebel’s syntax-based belief revision. The model guarantees a unique bargaining solution for each bargaining game without using lotteries. Its game-theoretic properties are discussed against the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. We also study essential computational properties in relation to our negotia-tion model. In particular, we show that the deal membership checking is DP-complete and the corresponding agreement inference problem is ΠP2-hard.
Cite
Text
Zhang and Zhang. "A Computational Model of Logic-Based Negotiation." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2006.Markdown
[Zhang and Zhang. "A Computational Model of Logic-Based Negotiation." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2006.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2006/zhang2006aaai-computational/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{zhang2006aaai-computational,
title = {{A Computational Model of Logic-Based Negotiation}},
author = {Zhang, Dongmo and Zhang, Yan},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2006},
pages = {728-733},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2006/zhang2006aaai-computational/}
}