ML Anthology

Using Iterated Best-Response to Find Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions

Victor Naroditskiy, Amy Greenwald
AAAI 2007 pp. 1894-1895
/aaai/2007/naroditskiy2007aaai-using/

Abstract

Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNE) have been derived analytically only for the simplest auction settings (Krishna 2002). Such settings include single-item first- and second-price auctions with continuous distributions of bidders ’ values1. Very lit-

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Cite

Text

Naroditskiy and Greenwald. "Using Iterated Best-Response to Find Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.

Markdown

[Naroditskiy and Greenwald. "Using Iterated Best-Response to Find Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2007/naroditskiy2007aaai-using/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{naroditskiy2007aaai-using,
  title     = {{Using Iterated Best-Response to Find Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions}},
  author    = {Naroditskiy, Victor and Greenwald, Amy},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2007},
  pages     = {1894-1895},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2007/naroditskiy2007aaai-using/}
}