Description Logics for Multi-Issue Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete Information
Abstract
We propose a framework for multi-issue bilateral negotiation, where issues are expressed and related to each other via De-scription Logics. Agents ’ goals are expressed through (com-plex) concepts, and the worth of goals as weights over con-cepts. We adopt a very general setting with incomplete in-formation by letting agents keep both goals and worths of goals as private information. We introduce a negotiation pro-tocol for such a setting, and discuss different possible strate-gies that agents can adopt during the negotiation process. We show that such a protocol converges, if the Description Logic used enjoys the finite implicants property.
Cite
Text
Ragone et al. "Description Logics for Multi-Issue Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete Information." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.Markdown
[Ragone et al. "Description Logics for Multi-Issue Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete Information." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2007/ragone2007aaai-description/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{ragone2007aaai-description,
title = {{Description Logics for Multi-Issue Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete Information}},
author = {Ragone, Azzurra and Di Noia, Tommaso and Di Sciascio, Eugenio and Donini, Francesco M.},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2007},
pages = {477-482},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2007/ragone2007aaai-description/}
}