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Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions

Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Kevin Leyton-Brown
AAAI 2007 pp. 122-127
/aaai/2007/rastegari2007aaai-revenue/

Abstract

In recent work [Rastegari et al. 2007a; 2007b] we study revenue properties of combinatorial auctions. Consider a well-known drawback of the famous VCG mechanism: a seller’s revenue can go down when bidders are added to an auction, contrary to the intuition that having more bidders should increase competition. Following an example due to Ausubel and Milgrom [2006], consider an auction with three bidders and two goods for sale. Suppose that bidder 2 wants both goods for the price of $2 billion whereas bidder 1 and bidder 3 are willing to pay $2 billion for the first and the second good respectively (see Figure 1). The VCG mechanism awards the goods to bidders 1 and 3 for the price of zero, yielding the seller zero revenue. However, in the absence of either bidder 1 or bidder 3, the revenue of the auction would be $2 billion.<br/><br/>We say that an auction mechanism is revenue monotonic if the seller’s revenue is …

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Text

Rastegari et al. "Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.

Markdown

[Rastegari et al. "Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2007/rastegari2007aaai-revenue/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{rastegari2007aaai-revenue,
  title     = {{Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions}},
  author    = {Rastegari, Baharak and Condon, Anne and Leyton-Brown, Kevin},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2007},
  pages     = {122-127},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2007/rastegari2007aaai-revenue/}
}