Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts

Mickey Brautbar, Michael J. Kearns, Umar Syed

AAAI 2010 pp. 723-728

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V24I1.7634 /aaai/2010/brautbar2010aaai-private/

Abstract

We consider risk-sensitive generalizations of Nash and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. We prove that, except for a class of degenerate games, unless a two-player game has a pure Nash equilibrium, it does not have a risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium. We also show that every game has a risk-sensitive correlated equilibrium. The striking contrast between these existence results is due to the different sources of randomization in Nash (private randomization) and correlated equilibria (third-party randomization).

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Text

Brautbar et al. "Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V24I1.7634

Markdown

[Brautbar et al. "Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2010/brautbar2010aaai-private/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V24I1.7634

BibTeX

@inproceedings{brautbar2010aaai-private,
  title     = {{Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts}},
  author    = {Brautbar, Mickey and Kearns, Michael J. and Syed, Umar},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2010},
  pages     = {723-728},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V24I1.7634},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2010/brautbar2010aaai-private/}
}