Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction
Abstract
Using a model of agent behavior based around envy-reducing strategies, we describe an iterated combinatorial auction in which the allocation and prices converge to a solution in the core of the agents' true valuations. In each round of the iterative auction mechanism, agents act on envy quotes produced by the mechanism: hints that suggest the prices of the bundles they are interested in. We describe optimal methods of generating envy quotes for various core-selecting mechanisms. Prior work on core-selecting combinatorial auctions has required agents to have perfect information about every agent's valuations to achieve a solution in the core. In contrast, here a core solution is reached even in the private information setting.
Cite
Text
Othman and Sandholm. "Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V24I1.7625Markdown
[Othman and Sandholm. "Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2010/othman2010aaai-envy/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V24I1.7625BibTeX
@inproceedings{othman2010aaai-envy,
title = {{Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction}},
author = {Othman, Abraham and Sandholm, Tuomas},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2010},
pages = {829-835},
doi = {10.1609/AAAI.V24I1.7625},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2010/othman2010aaai-envy/}
}