How Bad Is Selfish Voting?

Simina Brânzei, Ioannis Caragiannis, Jamie Morgenstern, Ariel D. Procaccia

AAAI 2013 pp. 138-144

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8667 /aaai/2013/branzei2013aaai-bad/

Abstract

It is well known that strategic behavior in elections is essentially unavoidable; we therefore ask: how bad can the rational outcome be? We answer this question via the notion of the price of anarchy, using the scores of alternatives as a proxy for their quality and bounding the ratio between the score of the optimal alternative and the score of the winning alternative in Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we are interested in Nash equilibria that are obtained via sequences of rational strategic moves. Focusing on three common voting rules — plurality, veto, and Borda — we provide very positive results for plurality and very negative results for Borda, and place veto in the middle of this spectrum.

PDF AAAI Semantic Scholar

Cite

Text

Brânzei et al. "How Bad Is Selfish Voting?." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8667

Markdown

[Brânzei et al. "How Bad Is Selfish Voting?." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2013/branzei2013aaai-bad/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8667

BibTeX

@inproceedings{branzei2013aaai-bad,
  title     = {{How Bad Is Selfish Voting?}},
  author    = {Brânzei, Simina and Caragiannis, Ioannis and Morgenstern, Jamie and Procaccia, Ariel D.},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2013},
  pages     = {138-144},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8667},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2013/branzei2013aaai-bad/}
}