The Cascade Auction - A Mechanism for Deterring Collusion in Auctions

Uriel Feige, Gil Kalai, Moshe Tennenholtz

AAAI 2013 pp. 313-319

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8560 /aaai/2013/feige2013aaai-cascade/

Abstract

We introduce a sealed bid auction of a single item in which the winner is chosen at random among the highest k bidders according to a fixed probability distribution, and the price for the chosen winner is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves price. We call such an auction a cascade auction. Our analysis suggests that this type of auction may give higher revenues compared to second price auction in cases of collusion.

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Cite

Text

Feige et al. "The Cascade Auction - A Mechanism for Deterring Collusion in Auctions." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8560

Markdown

[Feige et al. "The Cascade Auction - A Mechanism for Deterring Collusion in Auctions." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2013/feige2013aaai-cascade/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8560

BibTeX

@inproceedings{feige2013aaai-cascade,
  title     = {{The Cascade Auction - A Mechanism for Deterring Collusion in Auctions}},
  author    = {Feige, Uriel and Kalai, Gil and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2013},
  pages     = {313-319},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8560},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2013/feige2013aaai-cascade/}
}