Cost-Optimal Planning by Self-Interested Agents
Abstract
As our world becomes better connected and autonomous agents no longer appear to be science fiction, a natural need arises for enabling groups of selfish agents to cooperate in generating plans for diverse tasks that none of them can perform alone in a cost-effective manner. While most work on planning for/by selfish agents revolves around finding stable solutions (e.g., Nash Equilibrium), this work combines techniques from mechanism design with a recently introduced method for distributed planning, in order to find cost optimal (and, thus, social welfare maximizing) solutions. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, we present both a centralized, and a privacy-preserving distributed mechanism.
Cite
Text
Nissim and Brafman. "Cost-Optimal Planning by Self-Interested Agents." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8640Markdown
[Nissim and Brafman. "Cost-Optimal Planning by Self-Interested Agents." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2013/nissim2013aaai-cost/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8640BibTeX
@inproceedings{nissim2013aaai-cost,
title = {{Cost-Optimal Planning by Self-Interested Agents}},
author = {Nissim, Raz and Brafman, Ronen I.},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2013},
pages = {732-738},
doi = {10.1609/AAAI.V27I1.8640},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2013/nissim2013aaai-cost/}
}