Envy-Free Division of Sellable Goods

Jeremy Karp, Aleksandr M. Kazachkov, Ariel D. Procaccia

AAAI 2014 pp. 728-734

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V28I1.8815 /aaai/2014/karp2014aaai-envy/

Abstract

We study the envy-free allocation of indivisible goods between two players. Our novel setting includes an option to sell each good for a fraction of the minimum value any player has for the good. To rigorously quantify the efficiency gain from selling, we reason about the price of envy-freeness of allocations of sellable goods — the ratio between the maximum social welfare and the social welfare of the best envy-free allocation. We show that envy-free allocations of sellable goods are significantly more efficient than their unsellable counterparts.

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Cite

Text

Karp et al. "Envy-Free Division of Sellable Goods." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V28I1.8815

Markdown

[Karp et al. "Envy-Free Division of Sellable Goods." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2014/karp2014aaai-envy/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V28I1.8815

BibTeX

@inproceedings{karp2014aaai-envy,
  title     = {{Envy-Free Division of Sellable Goods}},
  author    = {Karp, Jeremy and Kazachkov, Aleksandr M. and Procaccia, Ariel D.},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2014},
  pages     = {728-734},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V28I1.8815},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2014/karp2014aaai-envy/}
}