Efficient Buyer Groups for Prediction-of-Use Electricity Tariffs

Abstract

Current electricity tariffs do not reflect the real cost that customers incur to suppliers, as units are charged at the same rate, regardless of how predictable each customer's consumption is. A recent proposal to address this problem are prediction-of-use tariffs. In such tariffs, a customer is asked in advance to predict her future consumption, and is charged based both on her actual consumption and the deviation from her prediction. Prior work aamas2014 studied the cost game induced by a single such tariff, and showed customers would have an incentive to minimize their risk, by joining together when buying electricity as a grand coalition. In this work we study the efficient (i.e. cost-minimizing) structure of buying groups for the more realistic setting when multiple, competing prediction-of-use tariffs are available. We propose a polynomial time algorithm to compute efficient buyer groups, and validate our approach experimentally, using a large-scale data set of domestic electricity consumers in the UK.