Pearl's Causality in a Logical Setting
Abstract
We provide a logical representation of Pearl's structural causal models in the causal calculus of McCain and Turner (1997) and its first-order generalization by Lifschitz. It will be shown that, under this representation, the nonmonotonic semantics of the causal calculus describes precisely the solutions of the structural equations (the causal worlds of the causal model), while the causal logic from Bochman (2004) is adequate for describing the behavior of causal models under interventions (forming submodels).
Cite
Text
Bochman and Lifschitz. "Pearl's Causality in a Logical Setting." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9411Markdown
[Bochman and Lifschitz. "Pearl's Causality in a Logical Setting." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2015/bochman2015aaai-pearl/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9411BibTeX
@inproceedings{bochman2015aaai-pearl,
title = {{Pearl's Causality in a Logical Setting}},
author = {Bochman, Alexander and Lifschitz, Vladimir},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2015},
pages = {1446-1452},
doi = {10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9411},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2015/bochman2015aaai-pearl/}
}