On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences

Abstract

We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents in the absence of monetary transfer. We propose a generic framework for evaluating sequential matching mechanisms with dynamic preferences, and show that unlike single-shot settings, the random serial dictatorship mechanism is manipulable.

Cite

Text

Hosseini et al. "On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9744

Markdown

[Hosseini et al. "On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2015/hosseini2015aaai-manipulablity/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9744

BibTeX

@inproceedings{hosseini2015aaai-manipulablity,
  title     = {{On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences}},
  author    = {Hosseini, Hadi and Larson, Kate and Cohen, Robin},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2015},
  pages     = {4168-4169},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9744},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2015/hosseini2015aaai-manipulablity/}
}