Game-Theoretic Approach for Non-Cooperative Planning
Abstract
When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a particular action, if this punctually solves the conflict, or it can resort to execute a different plan if the agent's payoff significantly diminishes due to the action deferral. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic approach to non-cooperative planning that helps predict before execution what plan schedules agents will adopt so that the set of strategies of all agents constitute a Nash equilibrium. We perform some experiments and discuss the solutions obtained with our game-theoretical approach, analyzing how the conflicts between the plans determine the strategic behavior of the agents.
Cite
Text
Jordán and Onaindia. "Game-Theoretic Approach for Non-Cooperative Planning." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9384Markdown
[Jordán and Onaindia. "Game-Theoretic Approach for Non-Cooperative Planning." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2015/jordan2015aaai-game/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9384BibTeX
@inproceedings{jordan2015aaai-game,
title = {{Game-Theoretic Approach for Non-Cooperative Planning}},
author = {Jordán, Jaume and Onaindia, Eva},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2015},
pages = {1357-1363},
doi = {10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9384},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2015/jordan2015aaai-game/}
}