Belief Revision Games

Nicolas Schwind, Katsumi Inoue, Gauvain Bourgne, Sébastien Konieczny, Pierre Marquis

AAAI 2015 pp. 1590-1596

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9415 /aaai/2015/schwind2015aaai-belief/

Abstract

Belief revision games (BRGs) are concerned with the dynamics of the beliefs of a group of communicating agents. BRGs are "zero-player" games where at each step every agent revises her own beliefs by taking account for the beliefs of her acquaintances. Each agent is associated with a belief state defined on some finite propositional language. We provide a general definition for such games where each agent has her own revision policy, and show that the belief sequences of agents can always be finitely characterized. We then define a set of revision policies based on belief merging operators. We point out a set of appealing properties for BRGs and investigate the extent to which these properties are satisfied by the merging-based policies under consideration.

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Text

Schwind et al. "Belief Revision Games." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9415

Markdown

[Schwind et al. "Belief Revision Games." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2015/schwind2015aaai-belief/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9415

BibTeX

@inproceedings{schwind2015aaai-belief,
  title     = {{Belief Revision Games}},
  author    = {Schwind, Nicolas and Inoue, Katsumi and Bourgne, Gauvain and Konieczny, Sébastien and Marquis, Pierre},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2015},
  pages     = {1590-1596},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V29I1.9415},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2015/schwind2015aaai-belief/}
}