Strategic Behaviour When Allocating Indivisible Goods

AAAI 2016 pp. 4177-4183

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V30I1.9877 /aaai/2016/walsh2016aaai-strategic/

Abstract

We survey some recent research regarding strategic behaviour in resource allocation problems, focusing on the fair division of indivisible goods. We consider a number of computational questions like how a single strategic agent misreports their preferences to ensure a particular outcome, and how agents compute a Nash equilibrium when they all act strategically. We also identify a number of future directions like dealing with non-additive utilities, and partial or probabilistic information about the preferences of other agents.

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Text

Walsh. "Strategic Behaviour When Allocating Indivisible Goods." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V30I1.9877

Markdown

[Walsh. "Strategic Behaviour When Allocating Indivisible Goods." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2016/walsh2016aaai-strategic/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V30I1.9877

BibTeX

@inproceedings{walsh2016aaai-strategic,
  title     = {{Strategic Behaviour When Allocating Indivisible Goods}},
  author    = {Walsh, Toby},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2016},
  pages     = {4177-4183},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V30I1.9877},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2016/walsh2016aaai-strategic/}
}