What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? an Experiment over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jean-François Laslier, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

AAAI 2017 pp. 494-501

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V31I1.10612 /aaai/2017/elkind2017aaai-multiwinner/

Abstract

We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules — SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin–Courant, and PAV — for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.

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Cite

Text

Elkind et al. "What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? an Experiment over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V31I1.10612

Markdown

[Elkind et al. "What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? an Experiment over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2017/elkind2017aaai-multiwinner/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V31I1.10612

BibTeX

@inproceedings{elkind2017aaai-multiwinner,
  title     = {{What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? an Experiment over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain}},
  author    = {Elkind, Edith and Faliszewski, Piotr and Laslier, Jean-François and Skowron, Piotr and Slinko, Arkadii and Talmon, Nimrod},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2017},
  pages     = {494-501},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V31I1.10612},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2017/elkind2017aaai-multiwinner/}
}