Towards Formal Definitions of Blameworthiness, Intention, and Moral Responsibility

AAAI 2018 pp. 1853-1860

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11557 /aaai/2018/halpern2018aaai-formal/

Abstract

We provide formal definitions of degree of blameworthiness and intention relative to an epistemic state (a probability over causal models and a utility function on outcomes). These, together with a definition of actual causality, provide the key ingredients for moral responsibility judgments. We show that these definitions give insight into commonsense intuitions in a variety of puzzling cases from the literature.

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Cite

Text

Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner. "Towards Formal Definitions of Blameworthiness, Intention, and Moral Responsibility." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11557

Markdown

[Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner. "Towards Formal Definitions of Blameworthiness, Intention, and Moral Responsibility." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2018/halpern2018aaai-formal/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11557

BibTeX

@inproceedings{halpern2018aaai-formal,
  title     = {{Towards Formal Definitions of Blameworthiness, Intention, and Moral Responsibility}},
  author    = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Kleiman-Weiner, Max},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2018},
  pages     = {1853-1860},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11557},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2018/halpern2018aaai-formal/}
}