In Praise of Belief Bases: Doing Epistemic Logic Without Possible Worlds

Abstract

We introduce a new semantics for a logic of explicit and implicit beliefs based on the concept of multi-agent belief base. Differently from existing Kripke-style semantics for epistemic logic in which the notions of possible world and doxastic/epistemic alternative are primitive, in our semantics they are non-primitive but are defined from the concept of belief base. We provide a complete axiomatization and a decidability result for our logic.

Cite

Text

Lorini. "In Praise of Belief Bases: Doing Epistemic Logic Without Possible Worlds." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11560

Markdown

[Lorini. "In Praise of Belief Bases: Doing Epistemic Logic Without Possible Worlds." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2018/lorini2018aaai-praise/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11560

BibTeX

@inproceedings{lorini2018aaai-praise,
  title     = {{In Praise of Belief Bases: Doing Epistemic Logic Without Possible Worlds}},
  author    = {Lorini, Emiliano},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2018},
  pages     = {1915-1922},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11560},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2018/lorini2018aaai-praise/}
}