In Praise of Belief Bases: Doing Epistemic Logic Without Possible Worlds
Abstract
We introduce a new semantics for a logic of explicit and implicit beliefs based on the concept of multi-agent belief base. Differently from existing Kripke-style semantics for epistemic logic in which the notions of possible world and doxastic/epistemic alternative are primitive, in our semantics they are non-primitive but are defined from the concept of belief base. We provide a complete axiomatization and a decidability result for our logic.
Cite
Text
Lorini. "In Praise of Belief Bases: Doing Epistemic Logic Without Possible Worlds." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11560Markdown
[Lorini. "In Praise of Belief Bases: Doing Epistemic Logic Without Possible Worlds." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2018/lorini2018aaai-praise/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11560BibTeX
@inproceedings{lorini2018aaai-praise,
title = {{In Praise of Belief Bases: Doing Epistemic Logic Without Possible Worlds}},
author = {Lorini, Emiliano},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2018},
pages = {1915-1922},
doi = {10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11560},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2018/lorini2018aaai-praise/}
}