MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism
Abstract
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.
Cite
Text
Segal-Halevi et al. "MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11450Markdown
[Segal-Halevi et al. "MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2018/segalhalevi2018aaai-muda/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11450BibTeX
@inproceedings{segalhalevi2018aaai-muda,
title = {{MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism}},
author = {Segal-Halevi, Erel and Hassidim, Avinatan and Aumann, Yonatan},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2018},
pages = {1193-1201},
doi = {10.1609/AAAI.V32I1.11450},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2018/segalhalevi2018aaai-muda/}
}