On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy

Daan Bloembergen, Davide Grossi, Martin Lackner

AAAI 2019 pp. 1796-1803

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33011796 /aaai/2019/bloembergen2019aaai-rational/

Abstract

Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group’s accuracy on variously structured social networks.

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Text

Bloembergen et al. "On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33011796

Markdown

[Bloembergen et al. "On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2019/bloembergen2019aaai-rational/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33011796

BibTeX

@inproceedings{bloembergen2019aaai-rational,
  title     = {{On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy}},
  author    = {Bloembergen, Daan and Grossi, Davide and Lackner, Martin},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2019},
  pages     = {1796-1803},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33011796},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2019/bloembergen2019aaai-rational/}
}