Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery

Abstract

In the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and the costs of shifting this preferred candidate up the voters’ preference orders. The goal is to find such a set of shifts that ensures that the preferred candidate wins the election. We give the first polynomial-time approximation scheme for the case of positional scoring rules, and for the Copeland rule we show strong inapproximability results.

Cite

Text

Faliszewski et al. "Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33011901

Markdown

[Faliszewski et al. "Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2019/faliszewski2019aaai-approximation/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33011901

BibTeX

@inproceedings{faliszewski2019aaai-approximation,
  title     = {{Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery}},
  author    = {Faliszewski, Piotr and Manurangsi, Pasin and Sornat, Krzysztof},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2019},
  pages     = {1901-1908},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33011901},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2019/faliszewski2019aaai-approximation/}
}