Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

AAAI 2019 pp. 3011-3018

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33013011 /aaai/2019/naumov2019aaai-blameworthiness/

Abstract

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.

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Cite

Text

Naumov and Tao. "Blameworthiness in Strategic Games." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33013011

Markdown

[Naumov and Tao. "Blameworthiness in Strategic Games." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2019/naumov2019aaai-blameworthiness/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33013011

BibTeX

@inproceedings{naumov2019aaai-blameworthiness,
  title     = {{Blameworthiness in Strategic Games}},
  author    = {Naumov, Pavel and Tao, Jia},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2019},
  pages     = {3011-3018},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33013011},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2019/naumov2019aaai-blameworthiness/}
}