Blameworthiness in Security Games

AAAI 2020 pp. 2934-2941

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V34I03.5685 /aaai/2020/naumov2020aaai-blameworthiness/

Abstract

Security games are an example of a successful real-world application of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.

PDF AAAI Semantic Scholar

Cite

Text

Naumov and Tao. "Blameworthiness in Security Games." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V34I03.5685

Markdown

[Naumov and Tao. "Blameworthiness in Security Games." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2020/naumov2020aaai-blameworthiness/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V34I03.5685

BibTeX

@inproceedings{naumov2020aaai-blameworthiness,
  title     = {{Blameworthiness in Security Games}},
  author    = {Naumov, Pavel and Tao, Jia},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2020},
  pages     = {2934-2941},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V34I03.5685},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2020/naumov2020aaai-blameworthiness/}
}