Power in Liquid Democracy
Abstract
The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index able to measure the influence of both voters and delegators. Using this index, which we characterize axiomatically, we extend an earlier game-theoretic model by incorporating power-seeking behavior by agents. We analytically study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such a model. Finally, by means of simulations, we study the effect of several parameters on the emergence of power inequalities in the model.
Cite
Text
Zhang and Grossi. "Power in Liquid Democracy." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V35I6.16729Markdown
[Zhang and Grossi. "Power in Liquid Democracy." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2021/zhang2021aaai-power/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V35I6.16729BibTeX
@inproceedings{zhang2021aaai-power,
title = {{Power in Liquid Democracy}},
author = {Zhang, Yuzhe and Grossi, Davide},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2021},
pages = {5822-5830},
doi = {10.1609/AAAI.V35I6.16729},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2021/zhang2021aaai-power/}
}