Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities

Haris Aziz, Warut Suksompong, Zhaohong Sun, Toby Walsh

AAAI 2023 pp. 5472-5480

doi:10.1609/AAAI.V37I5.25680 /aaai/2023/aziz2023aaai-fairness/

Abstract

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives utility from items that are assigned to other agents. This allows us to capture scenarios in which agents benefit from or compete against one another. We extend the well-studied properties of envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS), which applies to a more general public decision making model. We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

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Cite

Text

Aziz et al. "Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V37I5.25680

Markdown

[Aziz et al. "Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2023/aziz2023aaai-fairness/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V37I5.25680

BibTeX

@inproceedings{aziz2023aaai-fairness,
  title     = {{Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities}},
  author    = {Aziz, Haris and Suksompong, Warut and Sun, Zhaohong and Walsh, Toby},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2023},
  pages     = {5472-5480},
  doi       = {10.1609/AAAI.V37I5.25680},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2023/aziz2023aaai-fairness/}
}