Manipulation-Robust Selection of Citizens' Assemblies

Abstract

Among the recent work on designing algorithms for selecting citizens' assembly participants, one key property of these algorithms has not yet been studied: their manipulability. Strategic manipulation is a concern because these algorithms must satisfy representation constraints according to volunteers' self-reported features; misreporting these features could thereby increase a volunteer's chance of being selected, decrease someone else's chance, and/or increase the expected number of seats given to their group. Strikingly, we show that Leximin — an algorithm that is widely used for its fairness — is highly manipulable in this way. We then introduce a new class of selection algorithms that use Lp norms as objective functions. We show that the manipulability of the Lp-based algorithm decreases in O(1/n^(1-1/p)) as the number of volunteers n grows, approaching the optimal rate of O(1/n) as p approaches infinity. These theoretical results are confirmed via experiments in eight real-world datasets.