On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria
Abstract
We investigate two notions of correlated equilibrium for extensive-form games: the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) and the behavioral correlated equilibrium (BCE). We show that the two are outcome-equivalent, in the sense that every outcome distribution achievable under one notion is achievable under the other. Our result implies, to our knowledge, the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing a BCE.
Cite
Text
Zhang and Sandholm. "On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024. doi:10.1609/AAAI.V38I9.28859Markdown
[Zhang and Sandholm. "On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria." AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024.](https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2024/zhang2024aaai-outcome/) doi:10.1609/AAAI.V38I9.28859BibTeX
@inproceedings{zhang2024aaai-outcome,
title = {{On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria}},
author = {Zhang, Brian Hu and Sandholm, Tuomas},
booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2024},
pages = {9969-9976},
doi = {10.1609/AAAI.V38I9.28859},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/aaai/2024/zhang2024aaai-outcome/}
}