Backdoor Attack on Propagation-Based Rumor Detectors

Abstract

Rumor detection is critical as the spread of misinformation on social media threatens social stability. The propagation structure has garnered attention for its ability to capture discriminative information, such as crowd stance, which has led to the development of enhanced detection methods. However, these detectors are vulnerable to attacks that can manipulate results and evade detection, potentially disrupting public order or influencing public opinion. While adversarial attacks on rumor detectors have been studied, the use of backdoor attacks—an evasive and powerful method—remains unexplored due to the challenges in applying them to propagation trees. In this paper, we introduce the first backdoor attack framework against propagation-based rumor detectors, designed to maintain overall detector performance while enabling targeted attacks on specific rumors. We propose an adaptive discrete trigger generator that injects trigger nodes into critical nodes, creating evasive, transferable attacks. Extensive experiments on three real-world rumor datasets demonstrate that our framework effectively undermines the performance of propagation-based rumor detectors and is transferable across different architectures.