Parkes, David C.

81 publications

NeurIPS 2025 BundleFlow: Deep Menus for Combinatorial Auctions by Diffusion-Based Optimization Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes

NeurIPS 2025 Inner Speech as Behavior Guides: Steerable Imitation of Diverse Behaviors for Human-AI Coordination Rakshit Trivedi, Kartik Sharma, David C. Parkes

ICLR 2024 Decongestion by Representation: Learning to Improve Economic Welfare in Marketplaces Omer Nahum, Gali Noti, David C. Parkes, Nir Rosenfeld

NeurIPSW 2024 Evidence from the Synthetic Laboratory: Language Models as Auction Participants Kehang Zhu, John Joseph Horton, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes, Anand V. Shah

ICLR 2024 Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers Denizalp Goktas, David C. Parkes, Ian Gemp, Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras, Romuald Elie, Guy Lever, Andrea Tacchetti

ICML 2024 Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspective Safwan Hossain, Tonghan Wang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu

ICML 2024 Position: Social Environment Design Should Be Further Developed for AI-Based Policy-Making Edwin Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Tonghan Wang, Safwan Hossain, Henry Gasztowtt, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe, Yiling Chen

AAAI 2024 Strategic Recommendation: Revenue Optimal Matching for Online Platforms (Student Abstract) Luca D'Amico-Wong, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes

NeurIPS 2023 Data Market Design Through Deep Learning Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes

NeurIPS 2023 Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks Tonghan Wang, Paul Duetting, Dmitry Ivanov, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, David C. Parkes

ICML 2023 Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes

NeurIPSW 2023 Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2023 Predictive Multiplicity in Probabilistic Classification Jamelle Watson-Daniels, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun

ICLR 2022 CrowdPlay: Crowdsourcing Human Demonstrations for Offline Learning Matthias Gerstgrasser, Rakshit Trivedi, David C. Parkes

NeurIPS 2022 Explainable Reinforcement Learning via Model Transforms Mira Finkelstein, Nitsan Levy, Lucy Liu, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S Rosenschein, Sarah Keren

NeurIPS 2022 Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms Gianluca Brero, Eric Mibuari, Nicolas Lepore, David C. Parkes

NeurIPSW 2022 Meta-RL for Multi-Agent RL: Learning to Adapt to Evolving Agents Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2022 Reinforcement Learning Explainability via Model Transforms (Student Abstract) Mira Finkelstein, Lucy Liu, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenshein, Sarah Keren

NeurIPSW 2021 Deep Reinforcement Learning Explanation via Model Transforms Mira Finkelstein, Nitsan Levy Schlot, Lucy Liu, Yoav Kolumbus, Jeffrey Rosenschein, David C. Parkes, Sarah Keren

AAAI 2021 Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Price Mechanisms Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes, Duncan Rheingans-Yoo

NeurIPS 2020 From Predictions to Decisions: Using Lookahead Regularization Nir Rosenfeld, Anna Hilgard, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2020 Information Shaping for Enhanced Goal Recognition of Partially-Informed Agents Sarah Keren, Haifeng Xu, Kofi Kwapong, David C. Parkes, Barbara J. Grosz

AAAI 2020 The Effectiveness of Peer Prediction in Long-Term Forecasting Debmalya Mandal, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2019 Bayesian Fairness Christos Dimitrakakis, Yang Liu, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic

NeurIPS 2019 Finding Friend and Foe in Multi-Agent Games Jack Serrino, Max Kleiman-Weiner, David C. Parkes, Josh Tenenbaum

IJCAI 2019 Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences Duncan Rheingans-Yoo, Scott Duke Kominers, Hongyao Ma, David C. Parkes

IJCAI 2018 Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design Noah Golowich, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes

NeurIPS 2017 Multi-View Decision Processes: The Helper-AI Problem Christos Dimitrakakis, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic, Paul Tylkin

IJCAI 2017 Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots David C. Parkes, Paul Tylkin, Lirong Xia

UAI 2016 A General Statistical Framework for Designing Strategy-Proof Assignment Mechanisms Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes

IJCAI 2016 Automated Mechanism Design Without Money via Machine Learning Harikrishna Narasimhan, Shivani Agarwal, David C. Parkes

IJCAI 2016 Correlated Voting Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes

IJCAI 2016 Incentivizing Reliability in Demand-Side Response Hongyao Ma, Valentin Robu, Na Li, David C. Parkes

NeurIPS 2016 Long-Term Causal Effects via Behavioral Game Theory Panagiotis Toulis, David C. Parkes

IJCAI 2016 Measuring Performance of Peer Prediction Mechanisms Using Replicator Dynamics Victor Shnayder, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes

IJCAI 2016 Social Choice for Agents with General Utilities Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2015 Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes

NeurIPS 2015 Learnability of Influence in Networks Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Yaron Singer

NeurIPS 2014 A Statistical Decision-Theoretic Framework for Social Choice Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia

JAIR 2013 An Online Mechanism for Multi-Unit Demand and Its Application to Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Charging Valentin Robu, Enrico H. Gerding, Sebastian Stein, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nick R. Jennings

AAAI 2013 Automated Workflow Synthesis Haoqi Zhang, Eric Horvitz, David C. Parkes

NeurIPS 2013 Contrastive Learning Using Spectral Methods James Y Zou, Daniel J. Hsu, David C. Parkes, Ryan P. Adams

AAAI 2013 Dynamic Social Choice with Evolving Preferences David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia

IJCAI 2013 Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders Valentin Robu, David C. Parkes, Takayuki Ito, Nicholas R. Jennings

NeurIPS 2013 Generalized Method-of-Moments for Rank Aggregation Hossein Azari Soufiani, William Chen, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia

NeurIPS 2013 Generalized Random Utility Models with Multiple Types Hossein Azari Soufiani, Hansheng Diao, Zhenyu Lai, David C. Parkes

UAI 2013 Preference Elicitation for General Random Utility Models Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia

AAAI 2012 A Complexity-of-Strategic-Behavior Comparison Between Schulze's Rule and Ranked Pairs David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia

AAAI 2012 A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2011 Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms Jens Witkowski, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2011 On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions Florin Constantin, Malvika Rao, Chien-Chung Huang, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2011 Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting Yuga J. Cohler, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia

AAAI 2010 Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems Sven Seuken, Jie Tang, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2010 Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George L. Nemhauser, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2010 Hidden Market Design Sven Seuken, Kamal Jain, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2010 Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment Without Money James Y. Zou, Sujit Gujar, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2010 Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia

IJCAI 2009 A General Approach to Environment Design with One Agent Haoqi Zhang, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes

IJCAI 2009 Expressive Power-Based Resource Allocation for Data Centers Benjamin Lubin, Jeffrey O. Kephart, Rajarshi Das, David C. Parkes

UAI 2009 Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2008 An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, David M. Pennock

AAAI 2008 Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-World Auctions with Market Disruptions William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, Craig Boutilier

AAAI 2008 Economic Hierarchical Q-Learning Erik G. Schultink, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2008 Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2008 Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, William E. Walsh

JAIR 2008 ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange Benjamin Lubin, Adam I. Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes

UAI 2008 Learning and Solving Many-Player Games Through a Cluster-Based Representation Sevan G. Ficici, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer

JAIR 2008 M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2008 Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design Sven Seuken, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2008 Value-Based Policy Teaching with Active Indirect Elicitation Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes

AAAI 2007 An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains David C. Parkes, Quang Duong

JAIR 2007 Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, Quang Duong

UAI 2006 Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh

UAI 2005 Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes

IJCAI 2005 More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives Sébastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes

NeurIPS 2004 Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design David C. Parkes, Dimah Yanovsky, Satinder P. Singh

AAAI 2004 GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms David C. Parkes, Grant Schoenebeck

NeurIPS 2003 An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design David C. Parkes, Satinder P. Singh

IJCAI 2001 Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, Marta Eso

AAAI 2000 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar

AAAI 2000 Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar