Ventre, Carmine

13 publications

AAAI 2025 Asymptotic Extinction in Large Coordination Games Desmond Chan, Bart de Keijzer, Tobias Galla, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre

ICMLW 2024 To Compete or to Collude: Builder Incentives in MEV-Boost Auctions Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre

IJCAI 2023 Error in the Euclidean Preference Model Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre

IJCAI 2023 Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre

AAAI 2021 Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation Through Monitoring Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre

IJCAI 2018 Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre

JAIR 2018 The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre

AAAI 2017 Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre

IJCAI 2017 Social Pressure in Opinion Games Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre

AAAI 2015 A Mechanism Design Approach to Measure Awareness Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre, Gabor Aranyi

JAIR 2015 Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre

IJCAI 2015 Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre

AAAI 2015 Truthful Mechanisms Without Money for Non-Utilitarian Heterogeneous Facility Location Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre