Wellman, Michael P.

70 publications

IJCAI 2025 Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning and Search with Generative Models for Game-Theoretic Opponent Modeling Zun Li, Marc Lanctot, Kevin R. McKee, Luke Marris, Ian Gemp, Daniel Hennes, Paul Muller, Kate Larson, Yoram Bachrach, Michael P. Wellman
JAIR 2025 Empirical Game Theoretic Analysis: A Survey Michael P. Wellman, Karl Tuyls, Amy Greenwald
ICML 2025 Explicit Exploration for High-Welfare Equilibria in Game-Theoretic Multiagent Reinforcement Learning Austin A. Nguyen, Anri Gu, Michael P. Wellman
IJCAI 2024 A Meta-Game Evaluation Framework for Deep Multiagent Reinforcement Learning Zun Li, Michael P. Wellman
IJCAI 2024 Fraud Risk Mitigation in Real-Time Payments: A Strategic Agent-Based Analysis Katherine Mayo, Nicholas Grabill, Michael P. Wellman
JMLR 2023 Strategic Knowledge Transfer Max Olan Smith, Thomas Anthony, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 2021 Evolution Strategies for Approximate Solution of Bayesian Games Zun Li, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 2020 Generating Realistic Stock Market Order Streams Junyi Li, Xintong Wang, Yaoyang Lin, Arunesh Sinha, Michael P. Wellman
IJCAI 2020 Market Manipulation: An Adversarial Learning Framework for Detection and Evasion Xintong Wang, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 2020 Structure Learning for Approximate Solution of Many-Player Games Zun Li, Michael P. Wellman
IJCAI 2019 Cap-and-Trade Emissions Regulation: A Strategic Analysis Frank Cheng, Yagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 2019 Deception in Finitely Repeated Security Games Thanh Hong Nguyen, Yongzhao Wang, Arunesh Sinha, Michael P. Wellman
IJCAI 2018 A Cloaking Mechanism to Mitigate Market Manipulation Xintong Wang, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 2018 A Regression Approach for Modeling Games with Many Symmetric Players Bryce Wiedenbeck, Fengjun Yang, Michael P. Wellman
JAIR 2017 Welfare Effects of Market Making in Continuous Double Auctions Elaine Wah, Mason Wright, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 2016 Gradient Methods for Stackelberg Games Kareem Amin, Michael P. Wellman, Satinder Singh
AAAI 2016 Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, February 12-17, 2016, Phoenix, Arizona, USA Dale Schuurmans, Michael P. Wellman
IJCAI 2016 Welfare Effects of Market Making in Continuous Double Auctions: Extended Abstract Elaine Wah, Mason Wright, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 2012 Self-Confirming Price Prediction Strategies for Simultaneous One-Shot Auctions Michael P. Wellman, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald
UAI 2011 The Structure of Signals: Causal Interdependence Models for Games of Incomplete Information Michael P. Wellman, Lu Hong, Scott E. Page
AAAI 2010 Algorithms for Finding Approximate Formations in Games Patrick R. Jordan, Michael P. Wellman
JAIR 2010 Multiattribute Auctions Based on Generalized Additive Independence Yagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman
IJCAI 2009 Learning Graphical Game Models Quang Duong, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Satinder Singh, Michael P. Wellman
JAIR 2008 CUI Networks: A Graphical Representation for Conditional Utility Independence Yagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 2008 Knowledge Combination in Graphical Multiagent Models Quang Duong, Michael P. Wellman, Satinder Singh
UAI 2007 Constrained Automated Mechanism Design for Infinite Games of Incomplete Information Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel M. Reeves, Michael P. Wellman
IJCAI 2007 Iterated Weaker-than-Weak Dominance Shih-Fen Cheng, Michael P. Wellman
MLJ 2007 Learning Payoff Functions in Infinite Games Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman, Satinder Singh
AAAI 2006 CUI Networks: A Graphical Representation for Conditional Utility Independence Yagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 2006 Methods for Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 2005 Approximate Strategic Reasoning Through Hierarchical Reduction of Large Symmetric Games Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Kevin M. Lochner, Shih-Fen Cheng, Rahul Suri
IJCAI 2005 Learning Payoff Functions in Infinite Games Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman, Satinder Singh
UAI 2005 Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions Anna Osepayshvili, Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason
UAI 2004 Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information Daniel M. Reeves, Michael P. Wellman
JAIR 2004 Price Prediction in a Trading Agent Competition Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Kevin M. Lochner, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
JAIR 2003 Decentralized Supply Chain Formation: A Market Protocol and Competitive Equilibrium Analysis William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman
JMLR 2003 Nash Q-Learning for General-Sum Stochastic Games Junling Hu, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 2002 The 2001 Trading Agent Competition Michael P. Wellman, Amy Greenwald, Peter Stone, Peter R. Wurman
IJCAI 2001 On Market-Inspired Approaches to Propositional Satisfiability William E. Walsh, Makoto Yokoo, Katsutoshi Hirayama, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 2000 Compact Securities Markets for Pareto Optimal Reallocation of Risk David M. Pennock, Michael P. Wellman
ICML 2000 Experimental Results on Q-Learning for General-Sum Stochastic Games Junling Hu, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 2000 MarketSAT: An Extremely Decentralized (but Really Slow) Algorithm for Propositional Satisfiability William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 2000 Probabilistic State-Dependent Grammars for Plan Recognition David V. Pynadath, Michael P. Wellman
IJCAI 1999 Efficiency and Equilibrium in Task Allocation Economies with Hierarchical Dependencies William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1999 Graphical Representations of Consensus Belief David M. Pennock, Michael P. Wellman
MLJ 1998 Conjectural Equilibrium in Multiagent Learning Michael P. Wellman, Junling Hu
UAI 1998 Incremental Tradeoff Resolution in Qualitative Probabilistic Networks Chao-Lin Liu, Michael P. Wellman
ICML 1998 Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm Junling Hu, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1998 Using Qualitative Relationships for Bounding Probability Distributions Chao-Lin Liu, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 1997 Market-Oriented Programming (Abstract) Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1997 Representing Aggregate Belief Through the Competitive Equilibrium of a Securities Market David M. Pennock, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 1996 Generalized Queries on Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars David V. Pynadath, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1996 Optimal Factory Scheduling Using Stochastic Dominance A* Peter R. Wurman, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1996 Toward a Market Model for Bayesian Inference David M. Pennock, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1995 Accounting for Context in Plan Recognition, with Application to Traffic Monitoring David V. Pynadath, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1995 Path Planning Under Time-Dependent Uncertainty Michael P. Wellman, Matthew Ford, Kenneth Larson
AAAI 1994 A Computational Market Model for Distributed Configuration Design Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1994 State-Space Abstraction for Anytime Evaluation of Probabilistic Networks Michael P. Wellman, Chao-Lin Liu
AAAI 1994 The Automated Mapping of Plans for Plan Recognition Marcus J. Huber, Edmund H. Durfee, Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1994 The Automated Mapping of Plans for Plan Recognition Marcus J. Huber, Edmund H. Durfee, Michael P. Wellman
JAIR 1993 A Market-Oriented Programming Environment and Its Application to Distributed Multicommodity Flow Problems Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 1992 A General-Equilibrium Approach to Distributed Transportation Planning Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1992 UAI '92: Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, July 17-19, 1992 Didier Dubois, Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 1991 Preferential Semantics for Goals Michael P. Wellman, Jon Doyle
UAI 1990 Exploiting Functional Dependencies in Qualitative Probabilistic Reasoning Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 1990 The STRIPS Assumption for Planning Under Uncertainty Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 1988 Mechanisms for Reasoning About Sets Michael P. Wellman, Reid G. Simmons
IJCAI 1987 Dominance and Subsumption in Constraint-Posting Planning Michael P. Wellman
AAAI 1987 Probabilistic Semantics for Qualitative Influences Michael P. Wellman
UAI 1986 Qualitativce Probabilistic Networks for Planning Under Uncertainty Michael P. Wellman