STEDiff: Revealing the Spatial and Temporal Redundancy of Backdoor Attacks in Text-to-Image Diffusion Models

Abstract

Recently, diffusion models have been recognized as state-of-the-art models for image generation due to their ability to produce high-quality images. However, recent studies have shown that diffusion models are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where an attacker can activate hidden biases using a specific trigger pattern, causing the model to generate a predefined target. Fortunately, executing backdoor attacks is still challenging, as they typically require substantial time and memory to perform parameter-based fine-tuning. In this paper, we are the first to reveal the **spatio-temporal redundancy** in backdoor attacks on diffusion models. **Regarding spatial redundancy**, we observed the *enrichment phenomenon*, which reflects the abnormal gradient accumulation induced by backdoor injection. **Regarding temporal redundancy**, we observed a marginal effect associated with specific time steps, indicating that only a limited subset of time steps plays a critical role in backdoor injection. Building on these findings, we present a novel framework, *STEDiff*, comprising two key components: *STEBA* and *STEDF*. *STEBA* is a spatio-temporally efficient accelerated attack strategy that achieves up to **15.07×** speedup in backdoor injection while reducing GPU memory usage by **82%**. *STEDF* is a detection framework leveraging spatio-temporal features, by modeling the enrichment phenomenon in weights and anisotropy across time steps, which achieves a backdoor detection rate of up to **99.8%**. Our code is available at: [https://github.com/paoche11/STEDiff](https://github.com/paoche11/STEDiff).