Friend-or-Foe Q-Learning in General-Sum Games
Abstract
This paper describes an approach to rein-forcement learning in multiagent general-sum games in which a learner is told to treat each other agent as either a \\friend " or \\foe". This Q-learning-style algorithm provides strong convergence guarantees compared to an ex-isting Nash-equilibrium-based learning rule.
Cite
Text
Littman. "Friend-or-Foe Q-Learning in General-Sum Games." International Conference on Machine Learning, 2001.Markdown
[Littman. "Friend-or-Foe Q-Learning in General-Sum Games." International Conference on Machine Learning, 2001.](https://mlanthology.org/icml/2001/littman2001icml-friend/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{littman2001icml-friend,
title = {{Friend-or-Foe Q-Learning in General-Sum Games}},
author = {Littman, Michael L.},
booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning},
year = {2001},
pages = {322-328},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/icml/2001/littman2001icml-friend/}
}