Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games
Abstract
We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}})$ last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium. While the $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}})$ rate is tight for a large class of algorithms including the well-studied extragradient algorithm and optimistic gradient algorithm, it is not optimal for all gradient-based algorithms. We propose the accelerated optimistic gradient (AOG) algorithm, the first doubly optimal no-regret learning algorithm for smooth monotone games. Namely, our algorithm achieves both (i) the optimal $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in the adversarial setting under smooth and convex loss functions and (ii) the optimal $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{T})$ last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium in multi-player smooth monotone games. As a byproduct of the accelerated last-iterate convergence rate, we further show that each player suffers only an $\mathcal{O}(\log T)$ individual worst-case dynamic regret, providing an exponential improvement over the previous state-of-the-art $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ bound.
Cite
Text
Cai and Zheng. "Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games." International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023.Markdown
[Cai and Zheng. "Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games." International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023.](https://mlanthology.org/icml/2023/cai2023icml-doubly/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{cai2023icml-doubly,
title = {{Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games}},
author = {Cai, Yang and Zheng, Weiqiang},
booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning},
year = {2023},
pages = {3507-3524},
volume = {202},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/icml/2023/cai2023icml-doubly/}
}