Feature Partition Aggregation: A Fast Certified Defense Against a Union of $\ell_0$ Attacks

Abstract

Sparse or $\ell_0$ adversarial attacks arbitrarily perturb an unknown subset of the features. $\ell_0$ robustness analysis is particularly well-suited for heterogeneous (tabular) data where features have different types or scales. State-of-the-art $\ell_0$ certified defenses are based on randomized smoothing and apply to evasion attacks only. This paper proposes feature partition aggregation (FPA) - a certified defense against the union of $\ell_0$ evasion, backdoor, and poisoning attacks. FPA generates its stronger robustness guarantees via an ensemble whose submodels are trained on disjoint feature sets. Compared to state-of-the-art $\ell_0$ defenses, FPA is up to $3,000\times$ faster and provides median robustness guarantees up to $4\times$ larger, meaning FPA provides the additional dimensions of robustness essentially for free.

Cite

Text

Hammoudeh and Lowd. "Feature Partition Aggregation: A Fast Certified Defense Against a Union of $\ell_0$ Attacks." ICML 2023 Workshops: AdvML-Frontiers, 2023.

Markdown

[Hammoudeh and Lowd. "Feature Partition Aggregation: A Fast Certified Defense Against a Union of $\ell_0$ Attacks." ICML 2023 Workshops: AdvML-Frontiers, 2023.](https://mlanthology.org/icmlw/2023/hammoudeh2023icmlw-feature/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{hammoudeh2023icmlw-feature,
  title     = {{Feature Partition Aggregation: A Fast Certified Defense Against a Union of $\ell_0$ Attacks}},
  author    = {Hammoudeh, Zayd and Lowd, Daniel},
  booktitle = {ICML 2023 Workshops: AdvML-Frontiers},
  year      = {2023},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/icmlw/2023/hammoudeh2023icmlw-feature/}
}