A Model of the Common-Sense Theory of Intention and Personal Causation
Abstract
Certain general properties of man's ability to interpret the actions of other persons are discussed. Some distinguishing features of this common-sense theory include the nature of the modal operators of Can and Try, the asymmetry of implication, and the capacity to embed models within models. The structure of a proposed model of this naive theory of personal causation is presented. This model arrives at a specific interpretation of another's actions by showing that these actions represent a possible path to a particular goal that is consistent with the axioms of the belief system's theory of human motivation and personality organization.
Cite
Text
Schmidt and D'Addamio. "A Model of the Common-Sense Theory of Intention and Personal Causation." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1973.Markdown
[Schmidt and D'Addamio. "A Model of the Common-Sense Theory of Intention and Personal Causation." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1973.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/1973/schmidt1973ijcai-model/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{schmidt1973ijcai-model,
title = {{A Model of the Common-Sense Theory of Intention and Personal Causation}},
author = {Schmidt, Charles F. and D'Addamio, John},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {1973},
pages = {465-471},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/1973/schmidt1973ijcai-model/}
}