Permissions and Obligations
Abstract
This article describes a formal semantics for the deontic concepts -- the concepts of permission and obligation -- which arises naturally from the representations used in artificial intelligence systems Instead of treating deontic logic as a branch of modal logic, with the standard possible worlds semantics, we first develop a language for describing actions, and we define the concepts of permission and obligation in terms of these action descriptions. Using our semantic definitions, we then derive a number of intuitively plausible inferences, and we show generally that the paradoxes which are so frequently associated with deontic logic do not arise in our system.
Cite
Text
McCarty. "Permissions and Obligations." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1983. doi:10.1590/1806-9282.20210212Markdown
[McCarty. "Permissions and Obligations." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1983.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/1983/mccarty1983ijcai-permissions/) doi:10.1590/1806-9282.20210212BibTeX
@inproceedings{mccarty1983ijcai-permissions,
title = {{Permissions and Obligations}},
author = {McCarty, L. Thorne},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {1983},
pages = {287-294},
doi = {10.1590/1806-9282.20210212},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/1983/mccarty1983ijcai-permissions/}
}