Deals Among Rational Agents
Abstract
A formal framework is presented that models communication and promises in multi-agent interactions. This framework generalizes previous work on cooperation without communication, and shows the ability of communication to resolve conflicts among agents having disparate goals. Using a deal-making mechanism, agents are able to coordinate and cooperate more easily than in the communication-free model. In addition, there are certain types of interactions where communication makes possible mutually bcneficial activity that is otherwise impossible to coordinate.
Cite
Text
Rosenschein and Genesereth. "Deals Among Rational Agents." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1985. doi:10.1016/B978-0-934613-63-7.50027-9Markdown
[Rosenschein and Genesereth. "Deals Among Rational Agents." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1985.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/1985/rosenschein1985ijcai-deals/) doi:10.1016/B978-0-934613-63-7.50027-9BibTeX
@inproceedings{rosenschein1985ijcai-deals,
title = {{Deals Among Rational Agents}},
author = {Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. and Genesereth, Michael R.},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {1985},
pages = {91-99},
doi = {10.1016/B978-0-934613-63-7.50027-9},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/1985/rosenschein1985ijcai-deals/}
}