Belief Revision, Revised
Abstract
AbstractI outline a novel counterexample to the principle of belief revision, Anticipation: if both learning and learning not‐ would render belief in unjustified, you cannot now be justified in believing . If I am right, not only is the leading theory of belief revision false, so are various recently proposed weakenings. I develop and defend a new theory that correctly predicts the failures of Anticipation I argue for, predicated on the simple idea that one is justified in ruling out possibility just in case that possibility is sufficiently improbable.
Cite
Text
Lehmann. "Belief Revision, Revised." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1995. doi:10.1111/phpr.70037Markdown
[Lehmann. "Belief Revision, Revised." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1995.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/1995/lehmann1995ijcai-belief/) doi:10.1111/phpr.70037BibTeX
@inproceedings{lehmann1995ijcai-belief,
title = {{Belief Revision, Revised}},
author = {Lehmann, Daniel},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {1995},
pages = {1534-1540},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.70037},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/1995/lehmann1995ijcai-belief/}
}