Prolegomenon to a Theory of Conservative Belief Revision
Abstract
A standard intuition underlying traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change. In this paper we introduce a novel account of belief change in which the agent's belief state is modified minimally to incorporate exactly the new information. Thus a revision by p q will result in a new belief state in which p q is believed, but a stronger proposition (such as p q) is not, regardless of the initial form of the belief state.
Cite
Text
Delgrande et al. "Prolegomenon to a Theory of Conservative Belief Revision." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2003.Markdown
[Delgrande et al. "Prolegomenon to a Theory of Conservative Belief Revision." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2003.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2003/delgrande2003ijcai-prolegomenon/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{delgrande2003ijcai-prolegomenon,
title = {{Prolegomenon to a Theory of Conservative Belief Revision}},
author = {Delgrande, James P. and Nayak, Abhaya C. and Pagnucco, Maurice},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2003},
pages = {1391-1393},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2003/delgrande2003ijcai-prolegomenon/}
}