Weak Conditional Logics of Normality

Abstract

A default conditional # # has most often been informally interpreted as a defeasible version of a classical conditional, usually the material conditional. That is, the intuition is that a default should behave (implicitly or explicitly) as its (say) material counterpart "by default" or unless explicitly overridden. In this paper, we develop an alternative interpretation, in which a default is regarded more like a rule, leading from premises to conclusion. To this end, a general semantic framework under a "rule-based" interpretation is developed, and a family of weak conditional logics is specified, along with associated proof theories. Nonmonotonic

Cite

Text

Delgrande. "Weak Conditional Logics of Normality." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2003.

Markdown

[Delgrande. "Weak Conditional Logics of Normality." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2003.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2003/delgrande2003ijcai-weak/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{delgrande2003ijcai-weak,
  title     = {{Weak Conditional Logics of Normality}},
  author    = {Delgrande, James P.},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2003},
  pages     = {873-878},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2003/delgrande2003ijcai-weak/}
}