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Reaching Envy-Free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings

Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, Sylvia Estivie, Nicolas Maudet
IJCAI 2007 pp. 1239-1244
/ijcai/2007/chevaleyre2007ijcai-reaching/

Abstract

Mechanisms for dividing a set of goods amongst a number of autonomous agents need to balance efficiency and fairness requirements. A common interpretation of fairness is envy-freeness, while efficiency is usually understood as yielding maximal overall utility. We show how to set up a distributed negotiation framework that will allow a group of agents to reach an allocation of goods that is both efficient and envy-free. URL: http://staff.science.uva.nl/~ulle/pubs/files/ChevaleyreEtAlIJCAI2007.pdf

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Text

Chevaleyre et al. "Reaching Envy-Free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.

Markdown

[Chevaleyre et al. "Reaching Envy-Free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2007/chevaleyre2007ijcai-reaching/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{chevaleyre2007ijcai-reaching,
  title     = {{Reaching Envy-Free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings}},
  author    = {Chevaleyre, Yann and Endriss, Ulle and Estivie, Sylvia and Maudet, Nicolas},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2007},
  pages     = {1239-1244},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2007/chevaleyre2007ijcai-reaching/}
}