Multi-Winner Elections: Complexity of Manipulation, Control and Winner-Determination
Abstract
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we fully characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi-winner voting systems. Additionally, we show that several tailor-made multi-winner voting schemes are impractical, as it is NP-hard to select the winners in these schemes. URL: http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~arielpro/papers/multi.ijcai.pdf
Cite
Text
Procaccia et al. "Multi-Winner Elections: Complexity of Manipulation, Control and Winner-Determination." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.Markdown
[Procaccia et al. "Multi-Winner Elections: Complexity of Manipulation, Control and Winner-Determination." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2007.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2007/procaccia2007ijcai-multi/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{procaccia2007ijcai-multi,
title = {{Multi-Winner Elections: Complexity of Manipulation, Control and Winner-Determination}},
author = {Procaccia, Ariel D. and Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. and Zohar, Aviv},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2007},
pages = {1476-1481},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2007/procaccia2007ijcai-multi/}
}