Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
Abstract
Abstract An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings whereby each team’s profit is given by a submodular function and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so. We study the properties (such as closeness to Nash equilibrium or total profit) of the states that result after a polynomial number of such moves, and prove bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the corresponding games.
Cite
Text
Augustine et al. "Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011. doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-018Markdown
[Augustine et al. "Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2011/augustine2011ijcai-dynamics/) doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-018BibTeX
@inproceedings{augustine2011ijcai-dynamics,
title = {{Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games}},
author = {Augustine, John and Chen, Ning and Elkind, Edith and Fanelli, Angelo and Gravin, Nick and Shiryaev, Dmitry},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2011},
pages = {37-42},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-018},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2011/augustine2011ijcai-dynamics/}
}