Social Distance Games

IJCAI 2011 pp. 91-96

doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-027 /ijcai/2011/branzei2011ijcai-social/

Abstract

In this paper we introduce and analyze social distance games, a family of non-transferable utility coalitional games where an agent's utility is a measure of closeness to the other members of the coalition. We study both social welfare maximisation and stability in these games from a graph theoretic perspective. We investigate the welfare of stable coalition structures, and propose two new solution concepts with improved welfare guarantees. We argue that social distance games are both interesting in themselves, as well as in the context of social networks.

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Cite

Text

Brânzei and Larson. "Social Distance Games." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011. doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-027

Markdown

[Brânzei and Larson. "Social Distance Games." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2011/branzei2011ijcai-social/) doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-027

BibTeX

@inproceedings{branzei2011ijcai-social,
  title     = {{Social Distance Games}},
  author    = {Brânzei, Simina and Larson, Kate},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2011},
  pages     = {91-96},
  doi       = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-027},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2011/branzei2011ijcai-social/}
}