Manipulation in Group Argument Evaluation
Abstract
Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needsto reach a common position on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one. Thisproblem has been recently investigated by Caminada and Pigozzi. In this paper, we investigate the behaviour of two of such operators from a socialchoice-theoretic point of view. In particular, we study under which conditions these operators are Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.
Cite
Text
Caminada et al. "Manipulation in Group Argument Evaluation." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011. doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-032Markdown
[Caminada et al. "Manipulation in Group Argument Evaluation." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2011/caminada2011ijcai-manipulation/) doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-032BibTeX
@inproceedings{caminada2011ijcai-manipulation,
title = {{Manipulation in Group Argument Evaluation}},
author = {Caminada, Martin and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Podlaszewski, Mikolaj},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2011},
pages = {121-126},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-032},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2011/caminada2011ijcai-manipulation/}
}